

EXHIBIT NO. 47

[Telegram received]

TK. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

From: Chungking via N. R.

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 8:48 P. M.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

435, November 3, 5 p. m., (Section One).

Reference my 431 not rec'd in Dept. of November 1, 11 a. m.

Foreign Minister has now sent me copy of Generalissimo's message to President which was telegraphed yesterday to Hu Shih who no doubt will make it available to the Department. I am forwarding copy by airmail unless instructed to repeat it by radio.

The message differs in form but not in substance from that originally summarized to me by Foreign Minister.

It is not yet certain that Japan will undertake the difficult invasion of Yunnan from Indochina but I believe it is certain that in any case large Japanese air forces will operate from that base against the Burma Road within China and against the American or any other volunteer air force when they enter China.

It is true, of course, that a major defeat of a Japanese attack upon Yunnan would have very advantageous effects in restraining Japanese ambitions in the Far East.

If it should be found possible and practicable to send Anglo-American air units into Yunnan they should be in sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese air concentrations.

GAUSS.

KLP

[Telegram received]

DES. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

From: Chungking via N. R.

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:45 a. m., 4th.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

Priority.

435, November 3, 5 p. m. (Section Two).

Half or token measures would prove disastrous. Maintenance and supply of such an air force in Yunnan would heavily tax facilities of the Burma Road, operation of which would probably need to be under effective military control. Advance depots of supplies would need to be built up at once. Time factor is of utmost importance if as the Generalissimo thinks, Japanese are to move in immediate future.

The successful invasion of Yunnan by the Japanese would probably seriously affect Chinese morale and deprive China of supplies for continued organized resistance. I do not believe however, that it would result in any early solution of Japan's problem in China. Japan would still find herself obliged to maintain large forces in this country for an indefinite period.

(End of Message)

GAUSS.

BB

(Handed me by Mr. Liu XI-4-41, 9:30 a. m. /s/ SKH)

Telegram from Chungking November 2, 1941

(Rec'd from S File—H. E. F.)

Confidential.

Message of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt.

"In view of a rapidly developing danger which threatens to change the whole military situation in China, I have communicated the following views to Mr. Winston Churchill:

"Intelligence in which I have complete confidence shows that the Japanese are determined upon an attack against Yunnan from Indo-China in order to take Kunming and to cut China's lines of communication with Britain and the United States. Preparations are already on foot and the attack may be expected shortly. This is in my view the first step in their policy of expansion either northward or southward, and I feel therefore that I should bring to your notice certain facts and aspects of the situation. Indeed I feel it my duty and my right to impress them upon you, for much the future lies in your hands.

"Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that its capture is not merely one objective of Japan's war of aggression on [2] China but is a first and necessary step to free herself for fresh enterprises. And you will appreciate how vitally the coming battle will bear upon the safety of all countries on the Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike.

"You know you may count upon me to do my utmost to defend Kunming, and believe me when I tell you that my armies can do it. But you know as I do that I have no air force. And without an air force what can our army do against another that is strong in the air? A glance at the map will show that if the city falls, China will be cut off from supplies outside, and her armies will be encircled and deprived of all contact with yours and those of her other friends. And moreover the morale of the Chinese army and Chinese people will be shaken to its foundation. Our morale has stood for more than four years on the eastern fronts where our friends cannot directly reach us. It would be gravely menaced by a Japanese triumph on the one front where as all the nation knows the armed forces of our friends are within a hand's reach. For the first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible.

"For more than four years now China has kept some five million men in the field and thus immobilizes the [3] man-power of Japan. The implications of this must be clear to you; indeed I think they are already recognized by yourself and all other friends of China. If Kunming fell, Japan would then be able to cast all caution away and turn her whole might elsewhere. The coming battle is therefore not merely a question of victory or defeat of China but the peace and security of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of the European (?) war may hang upon it.

"If China had the air force she needs, I should be making no appeal to you, because I should feel confident of our ability to defeat the invaders. But we have nothing that can be called an air force to match against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon us, for we may be sure that they will use their finest and their strongest. If however in the battle the Japanese air force can be checked or even smashed, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh enterprise will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain to her, but with that she can do little without the strength in the air without which there would be an end to her schemes of expansion. From then on her submission could be brought about by political and economic pressure. Do not let us therefore make mistakes as they have made elsewhere in this [4] war, and let the Japanese attack us, as they mean to do, one by one, I am not asking you to declare war upon Japan. I merely wish to leave you in no doubt about the situation in which I find myself, to make it clear that I am no match of the enemy in the air, to tell you what this means and to suggest a remedy. The American volunteer air force now under training is good but very small. Our only hope is that the British air force in Malaya, with American cooperation, may come into action and support the American volunteers and the existing Chinese air force. The British air force could cooperate as part of the Chinese air force or assume the role of an international volunteer force. The result would be to save China and to save the Pacific.

"You might feel at a first glance that this would involve you in war with Japan while you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the Middle East. I see things otherwise. I do not believe that Japan feels that she has the strength to attack so long as the resistance of China persists. But once she is rid of this, she will attack you as and when it suits her and whether or not she is * * * by such action on your part as I have now suggested. It would be impossible to minimize the importance of British air action in Yunnan, for upon this the fate of democratic cause will [5] turn. China has reached the most critical phase of her war of resistance. Her ability to defend landward approaches to Singapore and Burma now depends primarily on British and American willingness to cooperate in the defence of Yunnan. If the Japanese

can break our front here we shall be cut off from you, and the whole structure of your own air and naval coordination with America and the Netherlands East Indies will be seriously threatened in new ways and from a new direction. I should like to express, with all the strength at my command, the conviction that wisdom and foresight demand that China be given the plea that I have indicated. Nothing else can ensure alike the defeat of Japan and the success of the countries now resisting aggression.'

"I have also discussed the strategic subject matter of the foregoing letter with Brigadier-General Magruder and have asked him to convey to you what I consider to be the decisive importance of the campaign in Yunnan. In addition I should like to urge on you my conviction that British determination in dealing with Japan waits at present upon the lead and stimulating influence of America; if the United States would draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation. I am convinced that unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time. The opportunity to check her is a fleeting one. You [6] are, Mr. President, recognized as the leader in the front of democratic nations fighting aggression. I feel sure that you will move with the rapidity that the urgency of the moment demands. It is now essential to avoid the errors by which statesmen of Europe allowed Nazi Germany to divide them and to acquire a commanding position, and to prevent Japan from attacking us in succession and separately and thus attaining the stature of a second Nazi Germany in the Far East."

(signed) CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

In reply refer to No. Op-16-F-2

Copy No. 1

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Office of Naval Intelligence,
Washington, November 1, 1941.

Secret

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Subject: Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 3/9/85/

1. In this dispatch Major McHugh assumes that a Japanese drive from northern Indo-China to cut the Burma Road is imminent. He further states that the only hope of blocking this drive would be active participation in the campaign of all American and British Far Eastern air units which would require foreign (presumably American) seizure and control of means of transportation and air fields in Yunnan province.

2. In a message which the American Ambassador states is now being forwarded to President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek states that the Japanese will launch a drive to cut the Burma Road within 30 days. He takes a somewhat less serious view of the situation than does Major McHugh. Chiang says that he has land forces adequate to defend the road but will need air support. He indicates that he desires aid from British and American air effectives in Singapore and Manila in a voluntary status. He says nothing about foreign control of Chinese air fields and Chinese means of communication.

3. Considering the extreme difficulty of the terrain between the Indo-China border and Kunming, it is believed that the *Chinese, if they fight* and are given some air support from Britain and America, can halt this Japanese drive. The Japanese now have less than 100,000 men in Indo-China. How many they can transport there in the next 30 days is problematical, but it is considered that they cannot maintain their present concentrations (which threaten Russia in the North), maintain their present garrisons in China, and at the same time spare more than 200,000 troops for the drive into Yunnan.

4. The real question here is: Will the Chinese fight? In this connection there have been many rumors that Lung Yun, Governor of Yunnan Province, has sold out or soon will sell out to Wang Ching-wei. If this happens there is little that Chiang Kai-shek, the British, or the United States can do to save the Burma Road. This rumor, however, lacks confirmation.

5. Chinese character should also be taken into consideration. When aid is promised to them they have a strong tendency to stop fighting themselves, sit back, and wait until the aid arrives. For this reason it might be well not to promise them too much. One other point should be mentioned. What Major

McHugh recommends is war-like action by the United States and Britain against Japan—in short, de-facto war with Japan. If we are going to fight Japan, rather than transporting our men and equipment to far-off West Yunnan province, thus placing ourselves under all the handicaps of difficult transportation, it would seem more sensible to attack the Japanese supply lines and home bases from our already established bases, thus diverting their attention from the Burma Road.

(Signed) R. A. BOONE,
FOR A. H. McCOLLUM.

Distribution: Original and 1 copy to DNI—Copy No. 1 and 2

CC—Op-16—F—Copy No. 3
Op-10/11—Copy No. 4
Op-12—Copy No. 5
File—Copy No. 6

[Copy]

Secret

From: Alusna, Chungking. Action: OPNAV PRIORITY

Date: 30 October 1941.

Tor Coderoom: 1450.

Decoded by: TIERS.

Paraphrased by: REISS.

300850 CR 0531

Active participation all American British Far East air units would be only hope for blocking invasion Yunnan which Sinos now seek. Supply and protection available fields however very serious task not repeat not presently feasible under existing conditions. Transport over Burma Road still insufficient and lacking coordination. Problem possible of solution only if highest home authorities order immediate action thereby justifying seizure and operating under foreign control of all available transport including civil air. Believe Chiang will support this also that general public reaction would inspire voluntary Sino cooperation. Present indirect methods for timely results totally inadequate.

20 OP File CNO File

Distribution:

16 Action Record Copy 12 13 Bauer File.

Naval Message

Phone Extension Number:

Addresses

Navy Department

Message precedence

From: Alusna Chungking

Released by: OPNAV P P P P P

Date: 30 October 1941

TOR Coderoom: 1433

De/coded by: TIERS

Paraphrased by: V. TUCKER

Astalusna Shanghai

CINCPAC

CINCAF

COMSOPAT

COM 16TH Nav Dist

P P P P P

Troops arrived daily Haiphong plus steady stream of supplies and materials reported arriving at Formosa and Hainan indicate possible invasion Yunnan. Such operation while difficult would be feasible if executed in force. Chinese contention that it would be turning point in battle for Asia believed correct. Capture of Kunming would completely crush Sino resistance while penetration even to Mengtze would close Burma Road. Foreign attaches here agree minimum requirement is 7 divisions and preferably ten.

Distribution:

16 Action

10/11 12 13 20OP FILE FILE.

[Stamped:] Confidential Top Secret.

OCTOBER 28, 1941.

2:42 P. M.

NPM 5342

Filed 0140

Priority

From: CHUNGKING.

To: FOR AMMISCA.

Number 28. October 28th.

Part 1. Especial attention Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The Generalissimo, who has been absent since our arrival, received me today, accompanied by MacMorland. After exchange of messages and amenities he expressed deep appreciation for the sending of the mission.

In order to get his reaction to the objectives of the mission I outlined my conception of the methods to be employed in making available the assistance afforded by lend lease material and services. I suggested five different military problems to which lend lease material was applicable and regarding which our personnel could collaborate on the solution. These were: 1, the communications problem; 2, the aviation project; 3, the supply of equipment to reorganized army forces; 4, the supply of raw materials; 5, the projects for training in and maintenance of new material.

Part 2. He made a note of these five points and expressed satisfaction with this method of approach, then quickly singled out aviation as the most pressing problem. He stated bluntly that he would like the mission to take over the control and development of his aviation service, disregarding apparently the Chinese air force and referring to Chennault's volunteer force as the only aviation that counted.

He requested with emphasis that a high ranking aviation officer be sent to take over his air force.

[2] I had no opportunity to comment on these points.

Becoming intently earnest he said there was another emergency about which he wished to ask immediate assistance. More follows.

Part 3. The Japanese, he knew, were preparing to attack Kunming from Indo China and cut the Burma Road. He expects the attack by the end of November. By a concentration of his land forces he could resist this attack, he said, but only if he had air support. Then, queried later, he insisted that he had the resources to defeat the Japanese if air assistance were forthcoming. The generalissimo insisted, and rightly, that Chinese resistance would end if Kunming were lost. In his analysis he argued that Kunming was the key to the Pacific, if it fell, China would fall, and the attack on Malay Asia would inevitably follow. War in the Pacific then, was a certainty. If China could hold, peace in the Pacific might be saved. But China must have air support, he repeated. The British should reinforce the American volunteer unit. They must be convinced of the necessity of this course of action. Although not so expressed, it was to be inferred that no other assistance would be forthcoming in time. Not once did he mention American reinforcements of any kind, pleading the critical situation he repeatedly said that only British air support could save China and peace in the Pacific.

Part four. The generalissimo then asked directly that I inform Washington of the threatening situation at once, and urge that the President intercede with London to make available the Singapore air forces to support his defense. Also he requested me personally to appeal to the British commander in chief in Singapore to the same effect. Para. Quoting some announcement of the administration to the effect that a movement [3] southward by Japan would be considered inimical to American interests, he argued that our govt could properly interpret an attack on Kunming in that light. Even worse, since it would be the first item in a more effective movement south if Chinese resistance were eliminated he added that with the Burma Road cut, America's right to trade with China would be infringed.

Part 5. He then pled that the President be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests. This course, he believed, would cause Japan to desist.

In the circumstances, I had no opportunity to turn the interview into channels in which I was authorized to act. I seized one opportunity to point to the critical deficiency of operations on the Burma Road that the success of the defense depended upon improving the traffic there whether or not the British gave all support. I further reminded him that an argument the British might offer for refusing

support would be their inability to supply their air units with the road in its present condition. With respect to the road I made clear that the mission was prepared to offer technical assistance in improving the conditions but that the political complications would have to be cleared by the Chinese themselves.

Part 6. The generalissimo informed me that he had taken up the question of aviation support with the British Ambassador on several occasions. Madame Chiang interjected that the Chinese had given assurances of support of large land forces if Singapore were attacked, but that Britain refused to give assurances of air support if Kunming were attacked, unless British territory were invaded.

I told the generalissimo that I could transmit his request to the Secretary of War.

[4] Previous to the interview I had drafted a radio on the subject of the probability of an attack on Kunming. Present indications point strongly that way. If successful, there is little doubt that China's resistance would end. Also it is doubtless true that without effective air support the Japanese might succeed in this decisive effort.

Part seven. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Kunming momentarily has become the key to the Pacific. There is no combat value in the Chinese air force. The American volunteers alone at present strength and as presently equipped are ineffective and will not be ready for combat for several months. Increments of lend lease aviation matériel contemplated will be too little and too late. Only British forces at Singapore, or perhaps organized units from the Philippines would be available in time to afford effective support to China.

I have discussed the interview with our Ambassador and he has read this radio.

MAGRUDER.

EXHIBIT NO. 48

WPD 2917-32

WPD 2917-26-47 398

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, November 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Method of Coordination of Command
in Coastal Frontiers.

1. The attached Joint Board case has been before the Joint Planning Committee since last February. At a recent meeting of The Joint Board, Admiral Stark suggested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal.

2. The case is divisible into two main subjects: Changes in Coastal Frontiers and the assignment of Command in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philippine Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of The Joint Planning Committee have reached an agreement with regard to changes in Coastal Frontiers. They disagree, however, as to the service that should exercise Unity of Command in the Coastal Frontiers.

3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on command are outlined in the attached Memorandum to you. The Memorandum also embodies my views on the question of unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

4. If The Joint Board desires definite action on this case, I recommend that you approve the attached Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with the solution proposed, which simply means that we will continue to operate by mutual cooperation. If you do not wish to raise the question of command at this time I can hold the case in suspense for the time being.

/s/ L. T. Grow,
L. T. Grow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

2 Incls:

Memo. to C/S, fr.
Actg. A. C. of S., WPD.
JB No. 356 (Ser. 678)